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Optima1 Use of Financia1 Information 
Jhinyoung Shin 1 
This paper inves디gates the conditions under which a posses-
sor of valuable information on fin없lcial security may prefer to 
sell it directly or 밍ve it away free of charge i.e .. donating it to 
other market paπicipants instead of trading on it. A market 
par디cip없lt will never find it op디mal to sell or donate the 
information that s/he has monopolistic ownership of. Otherwise. 
sale or donation of information has an impor떠nt commitment 
effect in that it cre며bly commits a risk neutral possessor of 
information to a strategy which promotes more intense compe-
디디on among informed traders in the market and makes the 
trading strategies of other informed traders less aggressive. It is 
this strategic externality that makes the selling or donation of 
informa디on an op디mal strate양T. The model in this paper also 
shows that if the security price does not fully reflect the private 
information of all the traders. diluting the seller's information 
before selling it is not op디mal even if the seller trades on her 
own account while selling her information. 
Keυwords: Strategic σading. Information sales. Donation of 
information. Fin밍:lcial information 
JEL Classifteation: D82. G14. L13 
I. Introduction 
Economic agents participate in the trading of financial securities 
for various reasons , most notably for the purpose of risk sharing or 
eaming profits , and the value of information on financial securities 
that these agents might have private access to cannot be empha-
sized too much. This paper investigates three possible use of private 
information on financial securities for the benefit of its possessor: 
trading on it, selling directly to other market participants who do 
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not own it, and giving it away to them. The third of using financial 
in[ormation is called donation o[ in1'ormation since unlike direci 
sales of financial information ‘ private information is given away free 
of charge to any market participants who are willing to take it. 
1 refer to direct sale of information as any case in which the end 
user 01‘ the informalion geis io observe the information beIore he 
decides 1.0 aci on iL The sale o[ information by a mechanism like 
the subscription to an investment newsletter of limited circulation 
is a typical example of this way of selling information. Thus , 
delegated portfolio management through a mutual fund manager for 
a fee is not covered by the definilion 0 1' a direct sale mechanism. 1 
The 낀rpical question that confronts 밍1 information seller in a 
financial market is why she has to resort to the sale or donation of 
information if she could directly trade on it herself and , 
presumably , make grea1.er profits thereby. This paper invesliga1.es 
the condilions under which a possessor of valuable informalion 
may prefer to sell or donate her information instead of trading on 
her own account. In addition , this paper explores the nature of the 
optimal sales strategy under different structures. 
First, ii is esiablished thai for a risk neu1.ral possessor 01‘ 
information who has monopolistic access to information about a 
financial security, it is never optimal to sell or donate it instead of 
trading on it. This conclusion is based on the assumption that 
trading in securilies can be achieved in an anonymous fashion. 
Once 나le sirong assumplion o[ monopolislic access 1.0 informalion 
is removed , it may no longer be optimal for an information 
possessor to abjure the direct sale of her information. In fact , the 
sale of information to c1ients who wi l1 then optimal1y use the 
in[ormation io decide their irading siraiegies has impor녕nt effecis 
on the nature of trading in the financial markets. Such a sale of 
information has imp아tant commitment effects in 바lat it credibly 
commits the information possessor to a strategy that would not be 
credible if she were 1.0 avoid such sales. Iniuilively, 1.he sale o[ 
in[ormation to a number o[ clienis provides [or more intense 
competition in the financial market. While this does reduce the 
total profits available to informed traders as a group , it also has 
the effect of making the trading strategies of other information-
lPlease refer to I3hattacharya and Plleiderer (1 985) [or the analysis o[ 
delegated por([olio rnanagernent. 
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based traders less aggressive. As a result, a1though the reduction 
in overa11 pro1ìts [rom irading may be subsiantia1, ihe individua1 
seller of inforrnation does not bear the full cost of the reduction in 
overall profits. This strategic extemality rnay rnake the selling of 
information an optimal strategy for the possessor of information. 
Exireme case of direci sales of information is sirnply giving away 
free of charge Le. , donating private information on fin밍lCl려 
securiiy. Any markei participants purchasing in[ormation 1'rorn ihe 
information sel1er expect to earn trading profit frorn it, and the 
information seller is exiracting a11 or pari 01‘ ihe information buyers’ 
trading profit by charging a positive price. It is shown that if the 
information seller is able to extract only small por디on of the 
information buyers' trading profit, and the profit frorn the sales of 
information constitutes a relatively rninor part of the seller’s total 
from her inforrnation. ihen straiegic e1Teci previously discussed will 
be ma원rnized by the donation of information. 
The issue 01' ihe selling iruormation in the contexi o[ 1ìnancia1 
markets has been analyzed by Admati and Pileiderer (1986. 1988a) 
in two papers. In Adrnati and pfleiderer (1986). ihey show thai in a 
competitive rational expectations setup, the optimal way to sell 
information is to rnake it coarser by rneans of adding 'personalized 
noise’ to the information. This addition of noise prevents full 
revelation of information by the rnarket price in the rational 
expecialions equilibrium. and ihus preserves ihe value 01‘ privaie 
information. In Admati and Pfleiderer (l988a), they show that it 
may be oplimal [or a monopolistic risk averse in[ormalion possessor 
to sell her information in order to achieve better risk sharing. 
The analysis in this paper yields resulis thai are differeni [rom 
those of Admati and Pileiderer , due to the use of a strategic rnodel 
of financial rnarket tra띠ng. In such a rnodel, given the specified 
sequence of moves on the part of various players, the final price 
never reveals the inforrnation in full as in a cornpe디tive rational 
expecialions [ramework, and ii may indeed be oplimal io sell 
information even \vithout appealing to risk sh밍ing considerations. 
In parlicular , this paper also shows ihai ii is oplimal for ihe seller 
never to dilute her information by the addition of noise , whether 
‘þersonalized’ or noi, even if she irades on her own accouni as 
well. Thus, the results in this paper rnitigate the objection that the 
optirnal strate않T established rnay be illegal due to discrirnination 
arnongst customers. 
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Fishman and Hagerty (1 995) and Sabino (1 993) also investigate 
the incentive for the sales of inforrnation. τbere are two major 
differences beiween Fishman and Hageriy (1995) and ihis paper. 
Firstly, in Fishman 밍ld Hagerty (1995), the sequence of game is as 
follows: (i) ihe markei maker chooses ihe price schedule; (ii) given 
the price schedule information seller decides the optimal informa-
tion selling siraiegy; and (iii) trading 01' securilies commences. ln 
this sequence of game, no matter what sales strate잉T is taken by 
the inforrnation seller, 안le price schedu1e chosen by the market 
maker does not change and consequently market liquidity is not 
affected by the sa1es of inforrnation. However, in this paper and 
Sabino (1993) , the firsi iwo siages are reversed, and considering 
the effect of inforrnation sales on the market liquidity, the infor 
malion seller oplimally decides ihe siraiegy of informalion sales. As 
will be shown in the fl이lowing section, the condition for the 
inforrnation sales are noi aHecied by ihe sequence oJ‘ game. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the model in this paper has fewer 
restriction than Fishman and Hager양r (1995) and Sabino (1993). 
This paper demonstrates that diluting the seller’s information before 
selling it is not optima1 even if the seller trades on her mVIl 
account while selling her inlormalion. Therelore , the results derived 
in this paper are a 10t stronger than those from Fishman 없ld 
Hagerty (1995) 따ld Sabino (1993). 
As mentioned above , this paper does not deal with the moral 
hazard aspect 01' ihe sales 01' financial in1'orrnalion. That issue is 
the focus of a paper by Allen (1 990) , in which he shows that in 
order to convince the buyer of the veracity of the inforrnation , the 
seller may have to make her own wealth contingent on the price 
outcome of the securi낀 about which she claims to have private 
in1'orrnation. The model in ihis paper, on ihe other hand, is based 
on the assumption that the buyers of inforrnation can costlessly 
ver피I wheiher ihe seller has engaged in adequaie inforrnalion 
gathering or not, although the precise outcome of the in、restigative
process is not direcUy observable to ihe buyer. The analysis in this 
paper is related to that of Kamien and Tauman (1 986) , in which 
thesin썽e patent holder of a cost reducing innovation in a product 
market finds it optimal to license unless he is a monopolist in the 
product market. Kane 밍ld Marks (1990) and Brennan and Chordia 
(1993) compare direct sales of inlormalion io other meihods 01' 
indirect sa1es of inforrnation. Kane and Marks (1990) shows that in 
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the presence of borrowing constraints, investors prefer direct sales 
of inforrnation. ln Brennan and Chordia (1993) , different ways to 
charge customers o[ informalion sales are compared 
This paper is also related to the work of Bushman and 
Indjejikian (19951 , in which ihe aulhors model a manager and 
market analysts who have costly access to information on the same 
random variable. They show 냐lat managers will disclose a noisy 
signal of their information to discourage the analysts from getting 
any information. Disclosure in their model reduces the potential 
profit for analysts and , thus , acts 1ike an entry deterrent. 2 
The rest of this paper is organized in four sections. Section II 
presents the basic model of 1he 1ìnancial markei which will be used 
삼lroughout the paper. The model is an adaptation of the model in 
Kyle (19851 , and lhe condilion for ihe sales of informalion is 
derived. The basic model introduced in Section n w il1 be genera1ized 
in Section III. The case o[ donation o[ in1'ormalion is analyzed in 
Section N. Section V discusses directions for future research and 
conclusions. All proofs are presented in Appendix 
11. The Model 
A single risky securiiy is iraded in a 1ìnancial markeL The ex 
post payoff of this security, denoted 0, is normally distributed with 
mean v. The innovation [rom 냐le ex anLe expecialion 0 1' V is 
composed of two components: the value of existing assets (i. e. , 
asset component) , denoted 0 , 밍ld the present value of growth 
opportunities (i.e. , gro，"，πh component) , denoted 등 respectively 
Specifically‘ 
v=v+ 0+ ε (1) 
θ and 흔 are mutually independent and normally distributed 
with mean 03 and variances σ잉 and σ2 respectiv얘 
꺼lere are five different types of agents participating in the 
2까1e intui1ion of reducing 1he profi1s on en1ry is not very differen1 frorn 
1he wel1 knovvn en1ry de1errence rnodels in 1he industrial organiza1ion 
litera1ur‘e 
~e assurne a zero rnean for sirnp1ifica1ion purposes. Al1 our resu11s go 
1hrough even if 1hese randorn variables , ins1ead , have a posi1ive rnean 
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financial market. A monopolistic il1φrmation seller4 has costless 
access to a private observation of both asset and growth compo-
nenis wiihout any noise.5 The inIormaUon seller can irade on her 
01"π1 account, sell her information , or do both. 
We assume ihat ihe naiure of ihe growth component is such 
that market participants other than the information seller are 
unab1e io obtain superior informaUon aboui its innovation. 
However , there are N market analysts who are able to ascertain the 
innovation in the asset component of the this ris납 security 
without any noise. Any traders who trade on the information 
obtained by studying the market by themselves are termed 
ana1ysis , and ihey are not allowed to buy inIormation from ihe 
information seller. Arbitrageurs and fund managers working for 
brokerage lìrms and invesiment banks , and even insiders , are 
included in this group. 
1n addition to ihe ana1ysis and the in1'ormaUon seller, ihere a1so 
exist liquidity traders who trade for reasons exogenous to the 
model , and a competitive market maker who set prices 암13t give 
them zero expected profits conditional on their information. The 
demand by the liquidity traders , which gets aggregated with the 
demand by oiher πaders ， is Ù, and ii is independent 01' è and È , 
and normally distributed with mean 0 and variances σαl“‘f2 
Suflìc디ienUψy many ouiside invesiors have neiiher information aboui 
v nor any liquidi인 demand for the security, and they are potential 
clienis 01' the in1'ormaUon seller. 
We model the mechanism of information sales as private 
provision of garbled signal of the seller's information. Specifically, 
we assume that the seller has access to the random variables 까’s 
and (Vj’s ‘ which can be used for garbling the signal before selling it 
to the ouiside invesiors.ß Thus. if ihe in1'ormaUon seller decides io 
'7his paper does not model how the information seller has obtained 
monopolistic right to sell her infoilllation. She might possess exclusive 
ownership of the technology that c긴n credibly eonvey her information to 
would-be buyers , or government sinlply bars any market participants other 
than 1his in[onna (ion seJ1er [rom selling 1heir in[oπna(ion 10 po\ential 
buyers 
''The resuHs do no\ change as [ar as the in[onna(ion acquisition cost to 
be incurred by the in[onnation seller is suflìcien t1y low that H is always 
optimal “r him to acquire cost1y in[onnaüon. 
~is method o[ garbling in[onnaüon is similar \0 the one generaJ1y 
rnodelled in 1he Iitera1ure. See. [or example , Admati and P l1eiderer (1 986) 
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se11 the info아rπrmat디ioαn on θ to K outηts잉i펴de investors with degree of 
no이ise (variance) (σ7?”lf’ 
inforηrrrπ'ma따tion on iJ from the se11er privately observes fl이lowing signal, 
ξ(θ)‘- 셔+ tL i, i- 1,2 , "',K. (2) 
On ihe oiher hand, if informalion on 응 is sold io M ouiside 
investors with degree of noise, σO.ω"κ; 
o이n ε has privaie access ÌJωo [0이11m、wν씨ing s잉igna따1， 
’ 
s(ε)j= ε+ 씨， J= 1‘2 ,"',M. (3) 
Al산lough information seller has perfect information on Ö and 흔‘ 
ii is assumed ihai ihe random variables í1 i’s and 따’s thai are 
used for garbling 0 and ξ before selling it to the outside investors 
cannoi be observed by t.he informalion seller.7 In[ormation seller 
precommits fo l1owing aspects of information sales policy before any 
signal on V is observed: t.he number o[ buyers o[ each component 
of V, and the levels of noise to be added to 11 and ε . 
Sequence of trading is given in Figure (1). Information seller 
announces information sales p이icy before any trader observes 
signal on the payoff of the secu디ty. Mter information se11er and 
and Bushman 때d In여ξjlkian (1 995). 
7까lis way of garbling sígnal before sellíng to the buyers ís cal1ed addíng 
‘personalized noise‘ by Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) explainin~ that “ Signals 
may be person따ízed in other , less dlrect 、.vays. For ex따nple‘ the seller may 
provide information that is va~ue and open to interpretation, so that the 
buyers themselves make personal, independent, errors of interpretation." If 
noise is added in this way. each buyer interpret the infomlation pru끼ded 
by the seller differently and the seller cannot possibly know how eιlch buyer 
ín(erprets (he ínforrna(ion. As ínformaüon ís sold ín thís way. each 
in[orrnaüon buyer observes di[[erent signal. Actual process o[ garbling sígnal 
can be conternplated ín the [ollowíng way. Instead o[ leüíng ín[onnation 
buyers know exact value of θ 따ld i=;, information seller jllSt provides basic 
inforrnation that are needed for the Valllεltion of θ and 흔. It is IIp to each 
inforrnation buyer to interpret the information and conduct valllation in his 
or her 0、，vn way. Then‘ depending on the way in which infonnation is 
interpreted and what method of valuation is adopted. infomlation buyer 、찌11 
reach ditIerent valuation of θ and È. that cannot be directly observed by 
the infOilllaüon seller , As more detaíled ínfonnaüon for the valuaüon o[ () 
and ε ís províded by the ín[onnation seller, (he level o[ noise is reduced 
accordíngly ’ 
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Information se l1er announces information sales policy 
Signal on í) is observed. and informalion is sold (0 ouiside 
investors 
Markei maker announces price schedules 
Liquidiiy demands are realized. and iraders submit markei 
orders to the market maker 
Price is set by the market maker 
Market observes V 
FIGURE 1 
TIMELlNE 
analysts observes signals on V‘ infonnation is sold to outside 
invesiors as precommiUed by 나le seller. and subsequenUy ouiside 
investors who just purchase information from the seller privately 
observes ilie signals on θ or 응 Then. market maker announces 
price schedule, and trading commences. Given the price schedule , 
traders including outside investors who purchase infonnation from 
the se l1er decide the sizes of their market orders , that are 
aggregated with orders of liquidity traders , and submitted to the 
markei maker. Price o[ ilie security is set by the market maker 
according to the price schedule. Finally, Ð is realized and trading is 
ended as payoH is 밍ven io 냐le markei participants 
111e propeπies of the random variables and the number of 
markei participanis including the ouiside invesiors get디ng infonned 
by the purchase of information are common knowledge , and eveIγ 
agent in the model is assumed to be risk-neutral 
Since there are sufficiently many outside investors who are 
potential clients for the seller‘ the equilibrium price of inforrnation 
is uniquely deiermined such thai the expecied 1rading prolìt 01 
each client equals the price that he pays for the inforrnation as the 
seller's informalion is auctioned 0[[ io ouiside invesiors. The 
outside investors who choose to become clients of information sel1er 
pay the price. and ilien they prtvaiely observe 나le inJ‘orrnation thai 
they purchase. Subsequently, they base their trading strategies on 
삼le purchased information. The clients of the inforrnation seller 
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purchase the unrestricted use of the se l1er’ s information in trading 
securities , but resale of the infonnation is assumed to be 
prohibiied.8 
A competitive market maker 밍lll0unces the p디ce schedule on the 
basis of all 1he public in[ormation available including 1he numbers 
of buyers of information on each component of v, and the levels of 
noise added io è or ε Then. 1raders place iheir markei orders io 
the market maker , who takes the aggregate net trading order to 
clear the market 밍ld sets the price such that he expects to earn 
zero profits. The market maker is assumed to observe only the 
aggregate net trading order, denoted fJ, and not the individual 
irading order5 submiUed. Following ihe siraiegic irading model 01 
Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988b) , the price schedule 
set by 1he market maker satislìes 1he following equation ihanks io 
the zero expected profits condition induced by the competi디on on 
ihe irading floor 
p~v+ ，1y~E[피낀l (4) 
Infonnation seller, analysts and clients of the infonnation seller 
are inJ‘onnation-based iraders who πade on iheir privaie in1'orma 
tion to e밍Tl trading profits λ is a measure of market liquidity and 
ii represenis how sensitively price moves as nei irading order 
submitted to the market maker changes. The equilibrium λ 15 
deiennined by the number 01' differeni types of in1'ormalion-based 
traders and the precision of their information. The information 
seller is a leader of this trading g:εune in that she is able to affect 
the equilibrium λ , and consequently influence the trading strategy 
of all the infonnation-based traders ‘ and ex ante trading profits of 
theirs. The ins1rumeni she uses to do ihis is 1he infonnation sales 
policy that she announces for access to her information 
'\vhile the information sellers are likely to be established financial 
institutions 、‘j다1 repuic'l_tion and long-term relationship ,vith their current 
and future customers, the c1ients of information seller tend to be gener며 
investors who cannot credibly convince other investors of the quality of 
information they try to reselL Since the émalysis of this paper is conducted 
on the basis of one-period model in which the infommtion is assumed to be 
shor1-lîved. în add î1îon 10 1he c1îents’ lack of credîbîlîty , ît îs conceîvable 
1ha1 1he înfomla1îon buvers cannot have enouQh tîrne 10 resel1 1heîr 
purchased în[orrnatîon 10 01her înves10rs be[ore tradîng begîns 
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The Nash equilibrium of this game follows from the analysis in 
Kyle (1985) 밍ld Admati and Pfleiderer (1988b). The equilibrium 
consisis o[ (1) informalion sales policy and a trading siraiegy [or 
the manager that ma임mize expected profits when the price 
funclional is taken as given; (2) trading straiegies [or ihe analysis 
that maximize their expected profits when the price functlonal and 
trading siraiegies o[ oiher iraders are iaken as given; (3) decision 
on information purchase. and trading strate앓r based on purchased 
information of outside investors; and (4) a price functional for the 
market makers such that they obtain a zero expected profit for 
every realization. 
The model presented in this seclion has a couple o[ imporiant 
characteristics , which leads to the results of this paper. First‘ in 
this model. ihe seller’s informalion cannot be leaked io non-clients 
before trading commences by being retlected in the price of the 
risky security. V찌len traders place their markei orders , ihey only 
observe the price schedule , not the actual price. Therefore , they 
decide the size of their trading orders only on the basis of their 
own information or their 1iquidi인 demand , taking into account the 
effects of their trading orders on the price. 
Second, ihe price cannot [ully relleci all iraders' privaie in[orma-
tion , and the market can never co11apse due to the presence of the 
traders wiih perfeci in[ormalion. This is because the markei maker 
is not able to distinguish random liquidity demand separately from 
trading orders o[ oiher πaders who irade on ihe basis o[ their 
information. 
In the fo11o\\끼ng analysis ‘ factors that determine which component 
of information to be sold will be analyzed , and optimal sale strate않r 
is characterized. 
111. Information S a1es Policy 
In ihis seclion, we analyιe ihe seller's incentives io sell her 
private information to other market partlcipants. Follm찌ng lemma 
presents market equilibrium given the information sales policy. 
Lemma 1 
Suppose K ouiside invesiors purchase inJormalion on θ with 
2 degree of noise (variance) of σμ ‘ and information on ε is sold to 
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M outside investors with degree of noise of σ}， then 
1. The equilibrium price schedule is P - V + λiJ where 
λ~_l !(N+l)(쩌 +2σ꺼2+K얘(얘+σ'1;) ‘ (샤+2σ"(2)2+Mσ/(0ει+σ끼 oι 
---------------------------0μ+ 0 
",,) ((N+K+2) 쩌 +2(N+2) σ끼2 ν ((M+2) 샤+4σ'，:r' 
2. Each analY5i’5 expecied irading pro1ìi. denoied πω 15 
lra= 
(σl+2 σ}):2 :2 
,,_., σ6 ， 
λ ((N十K十 2) σlí+2(N+2) c5μr 
3. The expected trading profit of the outside investor purchasing 
the information on U, denoted π8 ‘ 15 
σf;l2( σl+2 σ;) , 
2r6== ( (” σ6 ， 
λ ((N十K十 2) σlí+2(N+2) c5μr 
4. The e’qJected trading profit of the outside investor purchasing 
the information on ε , denoted π= ‘ 15 
7[ε 
σ，，2( 61'2+ σ'，，7) :2 
λ((싸i김파꾀;- C5s 
5. The expecied irading pro1ìi earrled by ibe in[orma(ion seller, 
denoted π5 ， is 
( σl+2 σ끼， ( σ}+2 끼.;)， 
π，- 、 σθ+ 、 •• σF 
씨(N+K+2) σ;+2(N+2) σμr λ ((M+2) σgι+4 σJι 
As shown in Lemma 1, information seller earns her trading profit 
from the information on asset component as well as on gro""πh 
component. Since analysts also have access to the information on 
asset component without any noise , seller's trading profit earned 
from ihe informalion on assei component is exacUy same as ihe 
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analyst’s trading profit 
Infonnation seller‘ analysts and infonnation buyers are all 
in[ormed iraders who expect (0 earn trading pro1ìt [rom iheir 
inforrnation on V. Their combined total trading profits are given in 
lhe 1'ollo‘꺼ng equation 
nT π。+Kπ"f! +Mπ+ πs 
r ~ (σ'rl+2 σ'，，~)1 1-
~ 1 z--; “‘" ~‘ :2 r"‘~、 λν σu 
(5) 
+K σe2 ( σj+ σ끼 ] 
I ‘ --‘ ~~~j，C_c_--c~~，~CO^"~ 6i 
+ r σ，'(σ‘2+σ3) , . (σ‘，2+26，.;)~rr?l 
l λrrM+21 서+4 η까2 σε + λrrM+21 서+4 η까 2 σε 1 
First two items in equation (5) are trading profits earned by 
information se l1er , analysts and information buyers from the 
inforrnation on asset component while the last two items are 
trading profiis earned by informalion seller and information buyers 
from gro""πh component 
In1'onnalion seIIer is a Slackelberg leader 0 1' ihe g잉ne III 냐1e 
sense that she effectively determines the equilibrium price schedule 
and expecied trading profiis o[ markei participanis by pre-
committing information sales po1icy at the beginning of the game 
Due to the sufficiently large number of outside investors bidding for 
the se l1er's information , in equ i1ibrium prices for the information 
are equal to the ex ante trading profits earned by the information 
buyers. That is , informalion seller fully exLracis trading profii io be 
earned by her c1ients. Thus , the seller's 0비ective is to m뻐mlze 
her toial prolìt that consists of her OWIl irading prolìt and 냐1e 
profit earned from the sales of her information. Specifically, the 
informalioIl seller will maximize 
!jTP 11'" ~ πs+Kπ'e+M πε (6) 
by optimaIly choosing (K,M , σ￡ 껴). Follm:ving proposition demon 
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strates which component of informatlon w i1l be sold to maximize 
the seller's total profit. 
f깐'oposítíon 1 
A monopolistic inIormaUon seller will never find ii opUmal io sell 
her information on growth component, but her total profit will be 
maximized by selling her in1'ormaUon on assei componeni io finHe 
number of outside investors. 
Propositlon 1 shows that the information seller does not sell the 
information on gro~아h component that she has monopolistic 
ownership 0 [, while she is able io earn greater toial profii by 
selling the information on asset component that she shares wi암1 
analysis. 
Since the information seller is the monopolistic owner of the 
in1'ormaUon on growih componeni, we c없1 see from equaUons (5) 
that the seller takes all the expected trading profit earned from the 
information on grm:vth component. The sale of information on 
growth component creates unnecessary competition between her 
clients 밍ld the seller herself, and the profit from the sale of 
in1'ormaUon on growih componeni always J‘hlls shori 0 1' the seller's 
profit which could be earned by trading on her information on 
growth component wiihoui selling iL There1'ore , it is desirable for 
her to keep the information on growth component to herself and 
trade on ii insiead of selling iL The intuition here leads to ihe 
same outcome as in the Cournot oligopoly model where industrγ 
profits are decreasing in a number of identical firms. 
However, the seller does not have monop이istic ownership of the 
information on asset component‘ and she has to face competition 
1'rom analysts and share the trading profii from ihe in1'ormaUon on 
asset component with analysts. Since the seller is not able to 
appropriate ihe enUre trading pro1ìt the informaUon on assei 
component by herself, her objective now is to maximize not the 
toial irading prolìt 1'rom the in1'ormaUon on asset componeni, but 
her share of it. 
The sale of information to clients who will then optimally use the 
information to decide their trading strategies has an important 
commitment effect in that it credibly commits the information seller 
to a straiegy 나1at would noi be credible if she 씨rere io avoid such 
sales. The sale of information to a number of clients provides for 
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more intense competition in the financial market. M1 ile this does 
reduce the total trading profits from asset component. it also has 
the effect 이‘ making the trading strategies 이‘ analysts less 
aggressive. This is actually the ‘strate밍c substitutability’ in the 
sense of Bulow, Geanal‘oplos , and Klemperer (1985). Although the 
reduction in 0、rerall trading profits from asset component may be 
substantial , the seller of information does not bear the full cost 이‘ 
its reduction. By se l1 ing her information to a number of c1ients , the 
information seller is able to make the trading strategy of the 
analysts less aggressive and increase her share of the trading 
profits from asset component at the expense of the analysts’ profit. 
It is this strategic extemality that makes the sales of informaUon 
an optimal strate않r for the information seller. 
In AdmaU and Plleiderer (1988a) , only a risk averse informaUon 
seller chooses to sell her informatlon for the purpose of better risk 
sharing with her clienis. As shown in ProposiUon 1. however, even 
with a risk neutral information seller, the presence of other 
information mvners in the market justifies her decision to sell her 
information , and she obtains higher profits by committing herself to 
a strate앓r that promotes more intense competi다on in the market.9 
Al나lOUgh ii is assumed thai the seller observes v withoui any 
noise ‘ the seller's decision to sell her information depends not on 
the precision of‘ her information, bui on the strategic effect of‘ 
selling her information which makes the trading strate않r of the 
analysis less aggressive. In parUcular , even i1‘ the seller’s informa-
tion is coarser than the analysts‘ informatlon , she will stlll choose 
to sell her information since this promotes 바le information• based 
competition in the market, by which she is able to obtain higher 
profits. 
Since the seller herself is also a trader in the markei, as 
information with lower degree of noise is provided‘ there might exist 
a tradeoff beiween her own πading prolìt and the pro1ìt from 
information sales. By creating more intense competltlon in the 
‘~his is quite a contrast to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a). They 
demonstrate that if either information seller or outsider investor is 
sumciently risk tolerant (i. e. , close to risk neutral), it is optimal to have 
01괴y one infoillled trader in the market. However. Proposition 1 implies that 
if lhe sel1er and oulside inves10rs are risk neulral , i( is always oplirnal 10 
increase the nurnber of infomled traders ín the rnarket unless the sel1er ís 
the rnonopolislic owner of 1he infonnation. 
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market, the seller's Qwn trading profit might suffer. 1n order to 
ma갱mize her total profit from trading and information sales ‘ the 
seller may have an incenlive (0 sell in[ormalion higher degree of 
variance by adding noise to her information before selling it. As the 
nexi proposition shows. in spite of 1his 1radeolT. the seller's profit is 
maximized by selling her information ‘as 15’ without adding any 
noise io it 
Proposition 2 
The information seller never finds it optimal to add any noise to 
her inforrnation on asset component before selling it 
From Proposition 2 , we can see that inforrnation seller now 
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Proposition 2 is quite a contrast to Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) 
in which 냐le seller with very precise informalion prefers to add 
personalized noise to her inforrnation before selling it. In their 
paper, based on a ralional expectalions model, ilie inforrnation 
purchased by clients is leaked to non-clients by being ref1ected in 
the price be[ore trading commences. As more precise inforrnation is 
sold by the seller, the price carries more of her information due to 
her clients ’ more aggressive use of it, causing faster deterioration of 
its value and even market breakdown. To prevent market collapse , 
the precision of the information sold to 삼le clients needs to be 
lower 냐lan a crilical level. Since more noise needs to be added as 
the seller’s inforrnation gets better, the seller cannot fulψ e앵loit 
her improved in[orrnalion [or her profit. Since ilie added noise 
terms are independent random variables , they observe different 
signals and submit di[[erent sized trading orders to ilie market 
maker although information sold to the seller’s clients has the 
same precision. Therefore , it is even possible that some clients 
make ex post trading profits while others suffer e.λ post losses 
In this model ‘ however there is no leakage of the seller's 
in[orrnalion io oilier markei participants before 1rading commences , 
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and price cannot fu l1y carηT traders' private information thanks to 
the random liquidity demand which is exogenous noise in the 
markeL As more precise in[ormaUon is sold io ihe seller's clienis , 
the value of information increases without ever causing market 
collapse , There[ore , ihe seller is able io sell ihe besi informaUon 
she possib1y can , and obtains the highest profit possib1e by selling 
her in[ormaUon ‘as is’ wiihoui adding any noise , 
Proposition 2 is a 10t stronger than a re1ated result in Admati 
and Pileiderer (1988a) 떠ld Fishm밍1 없ld Hagerty (1995) where the 
seller is restricted not to dilute her information in the sense that 
Proposi디on 2 demonstrates that even if there is no such restriction 
imposed on ihe seller, and she is allowed io diluie her in[ormaUon 
before selling it while she trades on her own information, the seller 
siill never 1ìnds ii opUmal io diluie her informalion be[ore selling iL 
There are a couple of important implications derived from 
Proposilion 2 , Firsi, ihe seller irades on exacUy ihe same informa-
tion as that sold to her c1ients. This implies that her expected 
trading profit is equal to that of each of her clients’ which is the 
price she charges for the information. Therefore , the total proftt she 
e핸ects to make by selling her information to K clients and trading 
on her own accouni is exacUy same as ihai by selling her 
information to K + 1 clients without being engaged in any trading 
herself. In equilibrium , as far as ihe seller communicaies honesUy 
there are the same number of traders in the market who trade on 
ihe seller’s in[ormalion wheiher ihe seller uliliιes boih oplions or 
not. 
Second‘ if the statistical properties of the seller’ 5 information and 
her decision on the sale of her information are common knowledge , 
one of the incentive problems on the part of the information seller 
can be avoided. Since ihe seller irades afier she is paid [or her 
information, in order to increase her trading profit, she has an 
incenlive io cheai her clienis by aciually providing ihe in[ormation 
with lower precision than the one for which they pay. Suppose the 
seller is resiricied io choosing beiween selling her in[ormalion and 
trading on it , and not allowed to do both. Proposition 2 shows that 
as long as 야le seller communicates hones t1y with her clients , tlús 
restriction does not change the sel1er’s total profit. Since the seller 
no longer trades when she sells her information , she has no reason 
io cheai her clienis , and her in[ormalion is communicaied honesUy. 
Thus , this model is able to provide a strong answer to the question 
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of why an information possessor may abjure trading total1y and sel1 
information only. This contradicts the central result in Allen (199이. 
Noie. however, ihai ihis paper has noi deali wiih ihe general moral 
hazard problem in Allen (1990) 
Comparative siatics on ihe equilibrium are collecied in ihe 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3 
1. The information seller sells her information on asset component 
to more outside investors as the number of analysts increases. 
2. As 펴 decreases, or 상 increases , information on asset compo-
neni is sold io more ouiside invesiors. 
As more analysis irade on iheir inIormation , ihey collectively 
trade more aggressively, which reduces the se l1er’s information sales 
prolìt. She is unable io recover all oJ‘ ihe loss incurred by ihe more 
aggressive trading of analysts , but she can sti11 retrieve part of the 
loss by se바19 her information to more clients at a lower price ‘ 
diluting the analysts' trading profits, and thereby enhancing her 
share of the market trading profits. 
As 삶 increases , in[ormation seller earns greaier portion oJ‘ her 
tota1 profit from the trading profit from the information on gro'-'πh 
component, and ihe seller is more 뻐lling to increase her trading 
profit from growth component at the cost of the profit from asset 
component io maximize her toial prolìt. This can be achieved by 
selling the information on asset component to more clients, i.e. , 
and thereby decreasing equilibrium ,1 , as can be seen from 
equation (7). The opposite is true in the case that α'7 increases. To 
protect her profit from the asset component, the seller is less 
willing to diluie ihe value o[ her in[ormation on assei componeni, 
and thereby she tends to sell her information to sma11er number of 
clienis 
Analysis has been conducted to this section based on the 
assumplion ihat ihe seller is able to [ully exiraci ihe her clienis 
expected trading profit by taking advantage of their bidding 
competition for the her information. As this assumption is relaxed 
and the sel1er cannot possibly extract the 100 percent of her 
clients e핸ected trading profit, next section shows that optimal use 
이‘ seller’s informalion is neiiher trading on it nor direcUy selling io 
outside investors. 
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IV. To Sell or Donate Information 
In this section we relax the assumption that the seller is able to 
fully extract her clienis’ expecied trading prolìL Insiead. 냐le seller 
earns βπi! from each c1ient , where π"() is the expected trading profit 
earned by each clieni and β ζ 1 is the resuU of a 1ransaction cosis 
incurred by the seller. lO Other aspects of the model remain the 
same. From equation (7), the seller’s total profit in this case is 
given in the following equation 
.7η σε2 σf βK σf 
n~"---+ + 















Next proposition demonstrates that if the seller can keep only a 
small portion of her clients' e)멍ected trading profit as her profit 
from the sales of information ‘ and the value of the inforrnation that 
she has monopolislic ownership is greaier ihan 1he one 1hai she 
shares with anaψ-sts‘ then her total profit can be maximized by 
simply giving away her informalion on asset componeni to ouiside 
investors. If the se l1er opts to use her information in this way, we 
call it donaLωTl oj' iqj'oπnaLion since the seller reveals her 
information to outside investors without charging any price 
Proposition 4 
The donation of inforrnation brings hi링1er expected profits for the 
in[orrnalion seller 1han sale o[ informalion i[ βζ 1/2 and 6ç2 /껴 is 
high enou앙1. However , if β>1/2 and N>2 ‘ then sale of infor 
malion is always superior io the donalion o[ informalion 
IOIf the seller has to pay tax for the profit she earns from the sales of 
her infommtion, or constant marginal cost is incurred by the seller for each 
of her client, then she cannot reta.in 100 percent of the client' expeded 
1rading profit as her profi1 [rorn the sales o[ in[ormation even 1hough the 
price paid by 1he in[onnation buyers is st il1 equal 10 1heir expec1ed 1rading 
profi1 
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πle first two terms of equation (8) are the seller’s trading projìt 
from the growth and the asset component, respectively, The 
expecied trading pro!ìt earned by each client is 7[e • σi/λ (N+K+2)2 ， 
and the last term of equation (8) is the seller’s profit from selling 
the in1'ormalion on the asset componenL The seller’s problem is io 
determine the optimal K*. We can also see from equation (8) that 
K • ∞ is equivaleni io the 1'ull disclosure 0 1' the assei componenL ln 
that case, π'0 = 0 and the seller does not charge any price for her 
information, and earn any benefit from selling. 
An information seller may choose to disclose or donate 
information to the market even though there is the op디on of selling 
it at a stricUy posilive price. The intuition for the result is more 
obvious close to the limit. For ex잉nple ， suppose 암le p디ce 암lat can 
be charged by the newsleUer is bounded by a small quanlity (i. e. 
β is small). In this case, most of the expected profit from sales is 
retained by ihe buyers 이‘ information. An increase in the number 
of buyers reduces the profits from the asset component, but due to 
a previously explained intuition for Proposition (3), it increases the 
profit in the growth component. For a small β， the increase in 
profits of the growth component outwei힘1S the decrease in the 
asset component and , thus , full disclosure (K* • (X) ) is oplimal. 1 1 
v. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes optimal use of private information on 
financial securities, and investigates the conditions under which a 
possessor of valuable information on financial security may prefer 
to sell it direct1y or give it away free of charge i.e. ‘ donating it to 
other market parlicipants instead 이 irading on iL A markei 
paπicipant will never find it optimal to sell or donate the 
information that s/he has monopolislic ownership 0 1'. Bui, i1’ other 
market participants also have access to the information , sale or 
donalion 0 1' information has an importani commiimeni effeci in thai 
it credibly commits a risk neutral possessor of information to a 
strate않T which prom아es more intense competition among informed 
traders in the market and makes the trading strategies of other 
11 When there are JÌni(e number o[ outsíde ínvestors ín the market , then 
the seller sells her ín[onnaUon on asse\ cornponen\ \0 all \hese ou\side 
ínvestors by char.웬ng a suffícíen t1y low price. 
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informed traders less aggressive. Tt is this strategic externality that 
makes the selling or donation of information an optimal strate않T. 
Since price cannoi reßeci all ihe privaie inIormaUon held by iraders 
ln 암le market‘ information sellers find it optimal to sell their 
in[ormaUon ‘as is' wiihoui adding any noise be[ore selling it io 
c1ients. 
Extreme case of direct sales of informalion is simply giving away 
free of charge i.e. , donating private information on financial 
secu디ψ. It is shown 야lat if the information seller is able to extract 
only small portion of the information buyers' trading profit, and the 
profit from the sales of information constitutes a relatively minor 
part of ihe seller's iotal fromher informalion. ihen strategic effeci 
previously discussed will be m뼈mized by the donation of 
in[ormaUon. 
This paper explores only the issues raised by the direct sales of 
informaUon. There are many other ways in which a possessor 이‘ 
valuable information may offer it for use in trading. For instance , 
mutual fund managers sometimes claim to invest their share• 
holders' money based on private information and research , but 
shareholders of a mutual fund never direct1y observe this 
informaUon. A broader comparison beiween such diJ‘l'erent selling 
methods is much needed‘ and this paper is best viewed as a first 
step. On the other hand. in[ormaUon sharing can be conducted 
when investors with private informatlon on risky securi앙 form an 
exclusive group among themselves and reveal iheir privaie 
information to each other before trading commences, and then 
trade the risky security based on shared information. Analysis of 
these two possible use of informatlon are left for further study. 
Another important issue in this context concerns the incentive 
problems 01‘ sellers. Ii is assumed boih thai 나le siaUsUcal prop-
erties of a seller’s information are common knowledge , and that 
truihful communicaUon can be guaranteed. This paper demon-
strates, however, that a risk neutral information seller need not 
trade to maximize her profii if her informaUon is iruthfully 
communicated. This , clearly, is not a complete solution to the 
general incentive problems. A more detailed appraisal of these 
issues in an integrated framework remains a topic for further 
research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose a linear price schedule of P=V+ 새 is 
announced by 냐le markei maker. We are going io prove 1hai ihis 
price schedule and the following linear trading strategies of 
in[ormation seller. analysts and informalion buyers form a Nash 
equilibrium 
• Information seller 
Orl+2 ()/; • σ}+2ð，，7 
φ e+rε= 끼 e+ ε ， 
시(K+N+2) σt+2(N+2) σ~) ,1 ((M+ 2) σ~~+4 αj 
• Analysts 
- 。3 十 2 。? -
ψU~ 0 u‘ 
λ ((K+N+2) (재 +2(N+2) σJ 
• Buyers o[ information on assei componeni 
ι 
。e
α(θ+tltl- , (θ+ ,ui) , 
λ ((K+N+2) σU十 2(N十 2) σ;) 
• Buyers of information on gro，"，πh component 
2 
(7ζ 
r( ε 十 wtl~ , (ε 十 Wi)
) λ ((M+2) σε+4 α끼 ) 
Taking the price schedule and other informed traders' trading 
strategies as given. the seller’ S oplimal 1rading s1raiegy is dertved 
from fo l1owing maximization problem given the information of θ 
and ε 
K M 
max E[x(v + íJ + ε E λ (x+N ψ íJ +~ α(θ+씨+~r(ε+야)+띠)1 δ， εl 
The 1ìrsi order condilion is given by 
e+ 능 2 λx λN ψ8 λKa iJ λMrε 0 , (A l) 
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Taking the price schedule and other informed traders’ trading 
strategies as given ‘ the analyst's optimal trading strategy is derived 
from following maximizalion problem 밍ven ihe in[ormation o[ ε 
K 
m용xE[z(v+ θ+ 응 U λ( øe+yε+z+(N- l) ψθ+~α(e+씨 
i-l 
,'v[ 
+~dε +w) +ù)) 1 e[ 
j=l 
The first order condition is given by 
θ λ ”θ 2 λz λ (N-l) ψθ λKαθ O. (A.2) 
Given informalion on è. each ouiside invesior buying information 
on asset component solves the fo l1owing maximization problem 
taking price schedule. and oiher 1raders’ 1rading siraie밍es as glven 
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The first order condition is given by 
~ ~ 
σθ ~ σθ σθ ~ 
←←τ (0+μ/，) λ@ ←←τ」τ(()+ρ/J- ，1Nψ ←「←τ(0+jí/J-2 .1 W
σU十oμ CJrJ + 0，μ σ(J +0，μ 
λ(K-l)α6() ., (è+씨 ~O 
σf!~+(Jμ 
(A. 3) 
Given informalion on ε. each ouiside invesior buying information 
on growth component solves the fo l1owing maximization problem 

































+ } J 
π
 





+~dε +w) +ù)) 1 ε+해 
)7ι l 
OPTIMAL USE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION 317 
The first order condition is given by 
:< :< :< 
a~ 6~γ=
)τ--τ (흔 +wzl λ7←τ_"_， (등十띠)-2λt λ(M-l)-， -'τ(ε 十ψÙ~O
σi'~+σ” σ't+ σω Oç:~+O，，; 
(A. 4) 
From equations (A. l ), (A. 2) , (A.3 ), and (A.4) we can have following 
set of simulianeous equalions. and by solving 나lese equations we 
can derive optimal trading strategies of informed traders 
2λØ+Nλψ+Kλα~l 
2λy+Mλ， -1 
λØ+(N+l) λ ψ+Kλα 1 
2 ι ι 2 
σa σ9 
λø-"쓰-;;-+Nλψ「←7十2λα+(K-l)λ 「← 
σf!~+(JI; σi+ σ (Jf!~+ σg σi+ σg 
ι :< :< 
σc σε O. 
λ7 ←，←;-+2λT+(M-l) λ --τ」그← ←←J←←τ 
σF 十σ끼ν σg ←「σ” σg 十η”
Given price schedule, the net aggregate trading order submitted to 
the market maker is given in the following equation 
K M 
y- øθ +yε+N ψ김 +~α(e+ íI')+~ r(ε+어j)+U. (A.5) 
Î-l )-1 
The markei maker seis ilie price schedule 냐lal oblεuns a zero 
expected profit for each realization of y, and the price schedule 
satisfies the follmving conditional expectation 
v+ λy~v+E[O+εIyl 
Expected trading profit earned by the inforrnation seller given in 
the Lemma 1 is derived in 냐le following equation 밍ven equilibrium 
trading strategies of informed traders and price schedule 
E[( øθ +yε)(v+ θ+ 흔 E λYJl 
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Expected trading profits of analysts , and information buyers are 
derived in the similar ways 
Q.E.D ‘ 
Proof of Proposition 1: Infonnalion seIIer.s ioiaI pro1ìi is 밍ven in 
the fo l1owing equation from Lemma 1 
STP nUH ~ πs+Kπ'o+M π‘ 
( σ'e2 + 2 σ，;)' ( σει +2 a(;f.! 
ι、 , 。 σ;i 十 ‘ ” σ: 
λ ((N+K+2) σθ +2(N+2) σJι λ ((M+2) σ'/+4 (J，，~)"' 
0]( σf 十이;) ') • ~ o}( σ‘2+σ.;) ‘ 
+K σIIL. +M "" 6 ," 
，1 ((N+K+2) σt+2(N+2) σJ‘ λ ((M+2) σε+4 σωl 
{σl+2 σf)2+KrIf(σoz+rI'02) " (rrf+2ι')ι+Nσ，2(σ'+ 끼，7) 
끼;-+ σc 
(IN十K+낌σθ+21N十 2)σ”ι IIM+2) σE十4 σωι 
=이j 
(N+l)(샤+2 α;)2 十 Kσlt σ(f+σf) 0 I김+2ctf十Mσ}(σ}+σ꺼 。
σπ+ σε ,1 ((N+K+2)σ'(:+2(N+2) σμ‘ IIM+2) σ'，:"+4 (;ιη‘ 
(A. 6) 
By 뻐king derivative of 11 、 with respect to M, we can find 11 ~:nP 
is monoionically decreasing in M. and iherel'ore optimal M is zero 
However , if we can find (òII I:oTP/ òKl IK=l>O ‘ and therefore , the seller 
can earn hi밍ler ioiaI pro1ìi by seIIing 냐le informalion on assei 
component 
Q.E.D ‘ 
Proof of pr‘'oposition 2: With M = 0 ‘ the seller t뼈1 profit is given 
in the following equa디on from equation (A.6) 
STP n π， +K π'f! +M πg 
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{σ감2 σ})2+K σ￡( σf+α야 σf 
60-+ 
((N十 K+2)돼+2(N十잉σ})2 4 
=6/< 
2 '"" 2,2 2 , 2 ι 
(N +1)(σθ +2 σ>;) 十K α { σθ +σ” σε 
(A. 7) 
σθ+ 
((N+K+2) σf十 2(N+2) σ이， 4 
STP By iaking derivative wiih respeci io 사. we can 1ìnd TT ;:>11' is 
monotonically decreasing , and therefore optimal 서 = 0 is obtained 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 3: Wi(h M-O. and 펴 O. ilie seller’s ioi따 
profit is nQW 
nSTP σε， (K+ 1) σ3 L 1 /0; (N十K十 1) σf + where λ j-+ 
4λ λ (N+K+2)' σ"J 4 (N+K+2)' 
By taking 다le derivative of 11 åTP wi다1 respect to K , we have 
anSTJ' σf J σ ， (N+K+ 1) 껴 t 
-----[ 十-----c-[
JK σ，，(N+K+2)" 4 (N+K+2)" 
.1/2 




B~←←←f깐----;:;o( - 1(' + K(N - 1) 十 2N' +3N) (A. 9) 
2(N十K十 2)'
Optimal K* is obtained from the solution of A+B=O given in 
equation (A.8). Since J(A 十 B)j òK<O , for all K. second order 
condition is satisfied. From equation (A.8), we can find J(A+B)j JN 
>0. 3(A+B)j β6f_2>Ü ， and δ (A+B)j 3 σ'rl<o. and iherefore. compara-
tive statics in 다le proposition are derived 
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 4: By taking 1he derivalive o[ n STP in 
equation (8) with respect to K, we have 
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Ò 11 åTP σ4 Jσ ， (N+K+ 1) σgt 3/2 
τ1-'+←←←←←1 IA+Bl (A.1O) 
3K σ"(N+K+2)δ 4 (N+K+2) ‘ 
where 




σ(T( β~十 K( βN+2β 3) 十 (N+ 1)(2 βN+4( β 1)+N) 
2(N+K+2)' 




」二 ←←←←←←←τ(1 β(N+2))(3K+3N+2) 
òK 2(N+K+2) “ 
(A.ll) 
(A. 12) 
For β으 1/2 and N?>2. (3A/ δK] +(δB/δK] < 0 holds [or all K and 
from equation (A.l l). We can see that A+B>O at K=O and K= 1‘ 
bui as K increases. A + B decreases io ∞ Thererore. ihere exisis 
a unique K*:> 1 such that (ò TT ..,/ åF이 I[(-K↑ <0 and (J'TI>/ò~)1κ JC< 
O. and TT s is maximized ai K i.' 
If rr 5TIJ increases in K츠 0 ， i. e .. (òTI ,/JK) ?>O. then optimal K* is 
+ ∞ and donation of inforrnation is the optimal strategy that 
maximizes n ..,. For β< 1 /2 , we can consider two possibilities 
• β 〈ζ 1/2 and 1 β(N+2)>0 
In this case ‘ from equation (A. 12) we have (JA/ òK] >0 and 
{θB/θK] >O. Thus , i[ A+B>O holds ai K-O , i. e .. 
'2 '2 
마 συ 
(N(2β+1)+4(β 1)) +•••--• ;;-(N+ 1)(2βN+4( β 1)+N) 
2(N+2)" 
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Ih U i! 
(N(2β+ 1) +4(β 1)) 1 ←」←+←←←」←τ (N+l) 1>0 
'8 2(N+2)" . 
then for N는 4， (JnSTP/òK) 는 o for all K and K*~ + ∞ IS 
obtained 
• β<1/2andl β(N+2)<0 
In 1his case , (r7Aj òK) > 0 is still inIe. and the minimum 0 1' A 
obtained at K = 0 is 
2 
σ〈
(N(2β+ 1)+4( β 1)) 
8 
But (òB/ òK) ιo holds for all K. and the minimum of B is now 
obtained at K ~ 十∞， which is σfβ Therefore , A+B:>O is satisfied 
for all K if follmving condition is satisfied 
2 
”‘ min A+min B~ _'_' (N(2β+1)+4( β 1 )) σf β>0 
8 
By combining iwo cases , we now have su[[j_cieni condition [or 1he 
donation of information 
β< 1/2 and 
σ3 
←二τN(2β+ 1) +4(β 1)) 써β>0 
8 
We can see that for 1 β(N+2)<0 ， (o;/8j(N(2β+1)+4(β 1 )) 
껴 β > 0 is more likely io hold for bigger N and 6 ç
2 bui smaller 껴， 
and the result follows 
Q.E.D 
(Receíved 13 Februw꾀 2003; Revised 11 March 2004) 
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